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FREDRIK LOGEVALL: Very pleased to be here to welcome all of you, to introduce our speaker. This event is part of our Mario Einaudi Center Foreign Policy Distinguished Speaker series, which is a series that's been going on for several years. If you have a program, you have a list of very, very eminent scholars, journalists, policymakers who have appeared in the series. And today's speaker certainly fits very well with this distinguished group.
And it's part of this foreign policy initiative that is really one of the centerpieces, if you will in, the Einaudi Center. And I'm very pleased to be associated with this program. I do want to extend some thanks before I introduce our speaker. We would not be able to do this, as the saying goes, without the support for the foreign policy initiative that we've received from the [? Sao ?] Giacomo Charitable Foundation from Mrs. Judy [? Biggs ?] from the Kessler family and from the Bartels family.
And just to alert you to the fact that we have coming up on March 30 an international forum, also sponsored by and organized by the Einaudi Center, which is on the EU financial crisis implications inside and outside the Eurozone. That's march 30 from 1:00 PM to 5:00 PM. So it's an afternoon event in 120 physical sciences-- very good, nice room in the physical sciences building.
And very distinguished speakers will be with us that afternoon. And you can get information on our website. We also have Lord Skidelsky coming up speaking on April 18. And then Peter Beinart will be here to speak to us on May 1. Information on those talks also on the website. And much other information as well on that website. I now want to introduce our speaker, Abbas Maleki will be here to talk today about Iran's foreign policy and its future.
And he is certainly somebody who can speak to that very important, very timely issue at a time when in Washington and in the world community at large there is much discussion about the crisis with respect to Iran and what to happen there. I think we're singularly fortunate to have Mr. Maleki here to talk to us today. He is the Robert E. Wilhelm Fellow at the Center for International Studies at MIT and Associate Professor of Energy Policy at Sharif University of Technology in Tehran.
He is also a Senior Associate of the Belfer Center International Security Program at Harvard. And he currently serves as Director General of the International Institute for Caspian Studies and Chairman of the Research Center for Scientific, Technological, and Industrial Policymaking. In addition to his scholarly work, Abbas Maleki has a distinguished record in public service. He served as deputy foreign minister of Iran from 1988 to 1997-- almost a decade-- and was one of the members of the negotiating team for ending the Iran-Iraq War.
Following his service as deputy foreign minister, he has become an advisor to Iran's Foreign Minister and Minister of Culture until 2002. From 1982 to 1985, he served as Director of the Department of Crude Oil Pricing at the National Iranian Oil Company. Recently, he was appointed as a member of the Network of Global Agenda Councils of the World Economic Forum in Davos for 2011-2012.
He has authored numerous publications, only a few of which I will mention here. These range in terms of topics from energy policy, energy security, public policy, and Iran's foreign policy and also Iran's relations in terms of the region, central Asia, Transcaucasia, and Caspian studies. He serves on the Editorial Board of the Central Asia and The Caucasus Journal and the Journal of Central Asia and Caucasus and has, as I suggested, co-authored many books and articles.
His most recent work, Iranian Foreign Policy-- Past, Present and Future Scenarios is due out in November of this year. Professor Maleki holds a PhD in strategic management from the High University for Strategic Sciences in Tehran. And today's talk, I also want to mention, is co-sponsored by Team Iran-Cornell and the Cornell Institute for Public Affairs. Please join me in welcoming Professor Maleki.
[APPLAUSE]
ABBAS MALEKI: Thank you. Thank you very much. Thank you very much. I would like to thank Mr. Director and the Center for International Studies in Cornell University for all of hospitalities they did for me. And I want to talk about Iran's history conceptual framework of Iran's foreign policy, structure process, future and scenarios of Iran.
If you look at this map, this map is Iran's in 2,500 years ago, from Mediterranean sea to Indian subcontinent, from Persian Gulf to Black Sea. Then, in Sasanide Empire, 1,500 years ago, the same Iran was very big-- central Asia, Indian subcontinent. And in Selgiukid Empire, 1,000 years ago also, Iran was very big. In Safavid Empire, 500 to 400 years ago, Iran also was big as Transcaucasia, Central Asia, part of Indian subcontinent, and Iraq.
And it shows in Quajar Empire, 100 years ago, which Iran lost, many territories-- Azerbaijan, Armenia, recent Azerbaijan, Armenia, Turkmenistan, Herat in Afghanistan and Pakistan part. And in 1907, Iran divided to two territories, influence of Russia and British. Now, Iran is like this country. Therefore, Iranians feel the war situation for Iran is becoming weaker every day.
For this reason, they must do something. This is the essence, the mentality of Iranians, which they are looking to modernism, to nuclear, to nanotechnology, higher education, and expansion of naval forces. Some of them, they are social phenomenon, some of them are technological, some of them are military. And the second issue which is very important conceptually is that Iran's society is reacting to the events in unexpected times.
For example, it was an agreement between British Talbot company and Iran in 1846 for tobacco, concession on tobacco. Suddenly, Iranians did a struggle against it in constitutional revolution in 1906. It was the first state or nation in the Middle East which did democratic revolution and change the situation.
In 1979, after 120 years of US-Iran's relations, suddenly Iranians did something against the United States as a colonial power, which was in the past a third power between Russia, Soviet Union, and UK. And internally against dictatorship of Shah, they did Islamic revolution. And during these days, with sanctions, with the many difficulties inside of Iran to the people, suddenly, a film Separation by Asghar Farhadi did Oscar in Los Angeles.
And Farhadi, when he received the Oscar, he said at the time, when talk of war, intimidation, and aggression is exchanged between politicians, the name of Iranians' country, Iran, is spoken here through her glorious culture, a rich and ancient culture that has been hidden under the heavy dust of politics. It shows that Iranians are in a strange, unprecedented-- they are reacting to the issues, that it is not precedent like other countries.
But on foreign policy, this is the structure of Iran's system after Islamic revolution in 1979. You should see this. This system is parliamentarian system. Parliament is the major center of power. President and others must work for parliament. But there is also a supreme leader there, which has many power.
And it shows process of Iran's foreign policy and opportunity or threat that foreign ministry of intelligence system, security system, ministry of defense, ministry of culture and guidance, they are cooperating together by Mr. President, sometimes from national security council, which is very important part of Iran's foreign policy decision making, and the same Iranian leader, parliament, cabinet, and rest of them.
If I want to do SWOT, analyze Iran's system, in social change, the S, Strength, of Iran is that 70% of population are under age 30; public ethic is high; attitudes-- there are many attitudes within Iran's society; and communications. In Middle East, Iranians they have most, maybe, Gmail, Yahoo, Facebook, Twitter, and other issues like that.
And weaknesses of this society is lack of accountability. It is not well-defined, the accountability for the decision makers; discretion among generations-- my son cannot understand my words sometimes; and dissatisfaction to daily life. If you go to Tehran, most of people, they say that we are not satisfied. It doesn't mean that they are against Iran's government. It is part of the mentality of Iranians.
Opportunities-- but this society is anxious to knowledge. Democratization process-- civil society and opening the country. They want, and you know that, Iranians are in all of the world students, professors. And challenges is our gap increase between expectations and reality of Iran's normal life.
Ordinary peoples, the gap is very high now. And religious and secular values inconsistency. In defense policy also, Iran is very strong. 1 million troops in ordinary military sector and IRGC revolutionary guard. The dual system of military strengthens the country for any threat. Self-sufficient in ordinary weapons, tanks, or artilleries, and others.
Weaknesses is the new sophisticated armaments lack and a skilled human shortage. But opportunities that two major threats near Iran, close to Iran-- Taliban, al-Qaeda, and Saddam Hussein had been collapsed. Shanghai cooperation organization is one organization which Iran is looking at. And cooperation with third-world countries, with African, Latin American countries.
Threats-- attack to Iran by United States or Israel and US military presence in the region. In economy also, population is very high; oil and gas, other minerals; transit routes to other countries, central Asia; high cash; high inflation, unemployment, and lack of foreign direct investment. Opportunities-- neighbors, markets, Iraq, Afghanistan, Azerbaijan; Asian energy thirsty; and globalization Islamic developed countries. These are the opportunities.
[? Sanction-- ?] US, EU, and United Nations, emerging new rivals like Turkey, and far distance to high tech. And in foreign policy, the final strength is geopolitics. 15 neighbors political system and decision making, which is very rational. Weaknesses-- delay in crafting strategies. There is a delay in decision making changes of administration and duality in national security council and foreign ministry.
Opportunities-- the new Asian identity of Iran, not in Middle East as in Asia; regional appearance, international organization. In all of the international organizations, Iranians are active in public diplomacy. Challenges-- United States in Iraq, Afghanistan, Persian Gulf; disintegration of neighboring countries-- it is very important for Iran. Iraq would be disintegrated, maybe-- and regional extremism, like Taliban, al-Qaeda, Salafis.
In conclusion, Iran has 1% of world population, 7% of world's natural reserves, 11% of global proven oil reserves, and 17% of world natural gas resources. Therefore, Iran has 11 times more oil compared with other countries. The case of the policies in foreign policy, the first is regionalism.
In regionalism, Iran has a paradox or two paradoxes. In decision making, sometimes Iranians believe it is better to have national sovereignty rights versus regional decision making in Asia or in OPEC, in other organizations. And in culture part, cultural part, cultural diversification versus common values, which is more globalized now.
One of the weaknesses of regional organization for Iran is lack of capacity. For example, economic cooperation organization is good for Iran, but capacity is not very high. Second is dominant regional power. Sometimes, Iran is dominant regional power; sometimes, other countries. It is very important for decision making in regionalism.
If you look at history, which I show you maps, there are four historical conceptual challenges and four new issues in Iran's foreign policy, the first, which was in history and now also, Caspian legal regime, Persian Gulf, Iran's Persian Gulf states relation, Iraq, and Afghanistan.
And four others is regionalism, Iran-US, Iran-EU, and nuclear file. For the four of the first issues which I mentioned for conceptual challenges, the first four conceptual challenges, Iran has four agreements with the neighbors. First is Iran-Soviet-Russia friendship treaty in 1921. It is very important. After the 1917 October revolution in Russia, Iran did the first agreement with Soviet Union.
Second is with Iraq, Iran with Britain, Iran-UK memorandum of understanding on situation of Abu Musa Island in Persian Gulf. This is after withdrawal of the UK troops, British troops from the East of Suez Canal. The third with Iraq is in 1975, Iran-Iraq Treaty on Friendship and Governmental Borders. And the last is Iran-Afghanistan Agreement on the portion of Hirmand waters in 1976.
Therefore, Iran's foreign policy has four challenges around of its borders and has four agreements with these countries around Iran. The first is with Soviet Union, or Russia at that time. Iran and Soviet Union agreed, instead of Caspian Sea or Kaspiysk or Caspian Sea or Hazar Sea to say to Caspian, the common sea of Iran and USSR in 1941-- they agreed.
It means that this seas sommon has condominium regime because the name is common sea of Iran and USSR. Now, between Iran and Russia, there are a buffer zone-- many countries. The threat of Russians now maybe it is vanished for Iran. And in Caspian Sea, Iran insists the best way is condominium, as it was in 1921 and 1941 agreements. But sometimes, Azerbaijan says Caspian is better to be divided.
Iran says, if it would be divided, the best way is 20% for Iran. Kazakhstan says it is better to be divided by international law of the sea. And the national law of the sea doesn't say enclosed lake or seas anything. But there is median line, which would be adoptable here. Azerbaijan says no. Iran's right is only-- and only-- 11%.
Because in Soviet Union-era, Soviet Union did not permit Iranian naval forces to go more than the line between Astara and Hassan Guli, which is the direct line between two borders. Anyhow, this is part of Iran's challenges in Caspian Sea. In Persian Gulf, there are three islands. In the past, it was part of Iran under Nader Shah Afshar and [? Qajar. ?] Then, British troops invaded.
In 1971, Iran occupied these three islands by agreement, which Iran did with British forces before withdrew. But after that, United Arab Emirates, especially Sharjah and Ras Al-Khaimah, they claimed some territorial claims against Iran. And this is very important. Iran-Arab relations is related to the case of these three islands, which I told you there is an agreement there.
The other case, which is very important for Iran's foreign policy in the region is the case of Chateau Arab or Arvand Roud. Arvand Roud or Shatt al-Arab is the river which comes from Turkey and Syria and joins together in al-Qurnah in Iraq. Shatt al-Arab comes to the border line to Iran and Iraq. If you look at Iraq access to the Persian Gulf, it is only 15 to 60 kilometers.
The Iranian access to Persian gulf Is 2,500 kilometers, Persian Gulf and Oman Sea. For this reason, the case is very sensitive here. And Saddam Hussein did war against Iran because of this treaty, which says the thalweg, the deepest line in Shatt al-Arab is the border line between Iran and Iraq. Saddam Hussein wanted to change it to the east coast of Iranian shore, which means that Shatt al-Arab is the domestic internal river of Iraq.
That was the eight-years war here. But there is also a treaty of 1975. If you look at Iraq, it is very important. Iran and Iraq-- land use of Iraq is in the Eastern part of the country. Most of Iranian use of land is in west. And population also-- Iraqis are in the east because of the sweet waters from Iran. And the population density of Iran is in the west.
Therefore, these two countries are very close together. Unfortunately, until the end of Saddam, they could not work together. Maybe in future they can do that. With Afghanistan, it is part of Iran-Afghanistan-Pakistan borders. There is Zahedan, Zabul, and others. There is a very important river there, Helmand, which feeds all of these villages.
And also, there is one lake. Afghanistan must send 11 to 27ths portion of water to this region because of agreement. But they deny sometimes, they reject. And this is one issue, which Iran's foreign policy is under the pressure of the peoples which they are living there. And some of them are emigrated to other parts of Iran.
Anyhow, Afghanistan is very important for Iran, especially after the demise of Taliban and al-Qaeda. Now, the only route of Afghanistan for goods, products, and imports is Iran. And if you look at the central Asia, maybe the closest part of access to high seas would be Oman Sea and Persian Gulf from Iranian side.
I proposed to the Iranian government to rent them, some ports in Oman Sea near Chabahar to do that. And now, the imports to Afghanistan would be from Oman Sea to Milak and [? Tohran. ?] These are some ports. Because from Pakistani side, [? Khyber ?] and other routes are closed after the drone accident and killed 27ths of Pakistani military troops.
Anyhow, it shows that Iran has access to all of central Asia and Afghanistan. And it shows the upper side, the northern part of routes from Caspian Sea to Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Afghanistan. My hypothesis is that in regionalism, that Iran's approach to its neighbor is cultural first, then political, then economic.
And it is very important, because if you go to China, Afghanistan, central Asia, Turkey, most of these countries are celebrating Nowruz, the new year or new day, which is 21 of March. This is purely a Persian-Iranian celebration. And it shows that Iran's culture has penetrated in all of the these countries along its borders.
Iran's foreign policy now, it's very important. That has changed dramatically. Iran should work in subregion-- Middle East, Persian Gulf, West Asia, central Asia, Caspian Sea. In the past, because of the Cold War and iron walls between Soviet Union and its allies and the rest of the world, Iran felt that 50% of its borders are closed from Azerbaijan to Afghanistan.
Iran failed in the past that it is a Middle East country. Now, Iran feels that it has Asian identity. Iran doesn't want to be as Middle Eastern country, near Eastern country. It prefers to be West Asian countries as access to China, to Kazakhstan, to Russia, to India as an Asian country, which this policy in Iran, they say, Asian identity.
What is thematic approach of regionalism for Iran? Is first self-reliance and exclusion of extraregional powers. It is very important. Iran tries to push out US forces from Persian Gulf. And Iran at the same time rejects unipolar system. For this reason, Iran works with Russia. Russia doesn't have good reputation in Iran because of two wars in 19th century.
But Iran denies unipolar system. It's going to have multipolar system. And cultural approach of Iran is that Iran needs to have better relations with all of the countries. Some people say that it is the Islamic culture-- no. For example, with Armenia, Armenia is a Christian country. Among the neighbors of Armenia, the best relations, Armenia has with Iran-- not with Turkey, nor with Georgia, nor Russia, nor Azerbaijan.
The best relations with Iran. It shows that national interest of Iran is preferred to Islamic values or ideological interests. Iran also is in multilateral organizations in this region, ECO, Economic Cooperation Organization, which is 10 countries, 10 states. They have complementarity in economic affairs, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and five central Asian states, Azerbaijan, and Afghanistan. OIC, Islamic Cooperation Organization, OPEC, Shanghai and D8, Islamic developed countries.
But what would be Iran after 20 years in future? Iran feels it must be becoming an economic and technological power in the region. Which region? West Asian region. If you look at this map, it is silk and spices road in the past in history. Most of them come from China's territories from maritime and also from [INAUDIBLE] to Iran to Europe.
Now, Iran proposes again another, which is here. This is North South Corridor. If you want to send from India to Europe something, some goods, you can send it via Suez Canal to Mediterranean Sea. There is another way to Bandar Abbas in Persian Gulf by railroad to Caspian Sea, from Caspian Sea to Volga River to Baltic.
The cost is one third of the first. It's very important. And North South Corridor between Russia, Iran, India, Turkmenistan, and others is working now very well. It shows the energy demand. In the past, energy demand was in United States, in North America, and West Europe. Now, demand is in China and India.
And supply also is in Persian Gulf and Caspian Sea. This overlap is very, very useful for Iran, for new pipelines to China from Caspian Sea, and from Iran to Pakistan, India, and LNG and oil ships to East Asia. OK. The other part of Iran's relations are four. Iran-US relations-- really, Iran and United States, in the past, they had good relations.
Then, after coup against Dr. Mosaddegh in 1953, Iran felt that United States is a country which needs a rentier state in Iran. That was the main cause of Iran's Islamic revolution in 1979. After that, from 1979 until now, the United States did many, many policies against Iran, supporting Saddam Hussein in eight years of Iran-Iraq War, case of the dual containment, if you remember, ILSA, Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, rogue states, axis of evil during President Bush, nuclear pariah, and recently, many, many sanctions.
This map shows that the US military around Iran is more than Canada or Mexico and other countries. From 15 neighbors of Iran, in 12 neighbors of Iran, United States has military bases and radar systems. If you were in Tehran and look at this map, it is very natural. You think, more security-oriented, a country with huge American troops around of this country, in Qatar, in Bahrain, in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Turkey, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Azerbaijan Republic.
It shows that the Iranian decision makers' case of security-oriented image for United States comes from which part of this policy. Iran-EU relations is not so good. But European countries, now 27 countries in European Union, all of them need energy. And energy is in Middle East, especially in Iran.
Iran is the second-largest owner of oil and gas in the world, conventional oil and gas. If you combine it, 13.38% of world proven reserves of oil and gas is in the hand of Iran. With these issues, which Iran is going to do that, export to Pakistan, export to Turkey and to European countries, Iran is one of major resources for oil and gas.
And it shows that Caspian Sea also, in addition of Persian Gulf, Caspian Sea resources must go to the markets. And one market would be from Iran Persian Gulf. But Iran also, in Persian Gulf says that instead of sending or exporting oil and gas from Caspian Sea to Europe, Iran is end users of oil in the northern part of Iran, in Tehran refinery, Tabriz refinery.
And instead of that, this is from Caspian to Tehran. It's 470,000 barrels per day, the capacity of these two pipelines. Iran says that Kazakhstan, Russia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan-- they can send oil to Iran to [INAUDIBLE] to Tehran. And Iran can give to their clients proportionate quantity of oil in Persian Gulf, which is [? high ?] [? seas. ?]
And it shows that Iran has access to energy resources and energy pipelines in all of the region. And the last point is Nuclear File. Nuclear File, which is very important these days-- really, there are few options for Iran to do that. As I told you, why Iranians went to the nuclear issue-- it was only and only because of pressure of United States.
United States gave to Iran one research reactor during President Kennedy and after that in 1960. Then, after the revolution, Iran wanted to build before revolution a nuclear power plant in Bushehr. And there are many reports, which Americans proposed to Shah, because of oil shark and many windfall money, it is better to work with Americans for a new project on atomic nuclear power plant.
Then, Iran preferred to work with German [INAUDIBLE] and [? KWH ?] with Eurodif enriched uranium French company. After revolution, they rejected to finish the project in Bushehr. Iran talked with China and Russia. And Russians agreed. United States opposed. And until now, this is one of problem of proliferation in all of the world.
At the same time, Iran has proposed many, many proposals to finish this problem. One of them is joint enrichment facility in Iran, because Iran has enrichment facility now in Natanz, in Isfahan, and in Fordo. Enrichment in Russian soil to send 3.5% nuclear enriched uranium to change it to 20% in Russia. And Iran proposed it. And United States opposed.
Fuel bank stockpiling of warm standby and cold standby and nuclear technology and security arrangement. If you look at it, I don't want to talk more about this, because my time is going to be finished. Really, Iran is eager to do a joint venture with Europeans. Iranian engineers believe United States is not so advanced in nuclear technology. And Russians also. Europeans maybe.
Therefore, the best is Iran needs three things. One is the technology. Second is management. And third is investment. Really, Iran is ready to do that. I don't know why the other side are rhetorically opposed to Iran many times. There are issues, which you know about the joint venture centrifuge plant, which both sides can do that.
And preventing nationalization-- also, it is very easy, very easy that Iran doesn't do nationalization. There is some ball bearings in centrifuges that it is exclusively Europeans that have this technology. And they can do that. Enrichment in Russian soil-- Iran agreed, and if you remember, Brazil and Turkey also were intermediate. But United States opposed.
Fuel bank-- it is also one way to do that, to end to this crisis, a stockpile within Iran also. Anyhow, nuclear issue is one issue that Iran is suffering. And sanction had been increased every day. How about future? This is the case of future studies. Uncertainties on global trends to 2015 is globalization, New World Order for Iran, the oil price, global environment, war against terrorism, and nuclear proliferation.
Key uncertainty for Iran is survival strategy works. Because, as I told you, when you are in Tehran, you feel that the United States, UK, and France are increasing pressure. The troops of United States, American troops are around Iran. Therefore, you are thinking about survival, not a development strategy-- surviving to be survives.
Oil price is one of uncertain matters in destiny of Iran. Really, Iran doesn't know what is the oil price. Nobody knows, really. God maybe knows that. Oil price is increasing, decreasing? Nobody really-- all of the future studies and scenarios cannot calculate oil price to be specified what is the oil price in next year. Levels of unemployment and inflation is very important for Iran.
Iran domestic affairs now is very important. And bipartisan policy in Washington. Really, Iran doesn't have any lobby, something like that in Washington, among Congress, among the government. It is a very, very negative point. And it has a lot of impacts for Iran. Driving forces. Driving forces for Iran would be US behavior as a great power with long hostile relations with Iran.
Sometimes, the United States talks with Iran with leadership, sometimes isolation strategy, sometimes engagement, sometimes sticks and carrots, sometimes sticks only and military attack. This is US behavior for Iran, which now is more in sanction, sticks and military attack. In other side, driving forces is Iran's society is willing to have better life.
Iranians are smart and eager to know more. These driving forces causes basic trends to the Iran scenarios, which I want to talk about. Globally, the main trend is still toward assignment of national advantages in energy security [? still. ?] State-owned enterprises-- they are talking. Finally, they are deciding. And technologically, US is leader, but socially, Iran culture believes Europe as great partner for Iran.
Three scenarios of Iran-- Caspian Caviar, Unripe Persimmon, and Juicy Watermelon. I think in the future the first is the best-case scenario, which Iran and international community taking a moderate, pragmatic approach. I think it is very good. Iran would be the most important country in the region, should be part of GCC, and sign trade TCA with Europe, and compromise on nuclear human rights and others, what I think it is less probable to be happened.
Second is Unripe Persimmon. These are Iranians' worst-case scenario, which is rapid increase of political tensions on all sides, eventual closure of the market to foreign business, and sanctions would be tougher and harsher, like central bank, which was done, maritime embargo, ban on air flights, something. This is nightmare for Iranians.
The pragmatic one is Juicy Watermelon, which is tension, yes. Really, before revolution, also Iran did not have coordination with all of the powers in the world, had many different views with Soviet Union, even with United States, with Britain, with France. But tension would be controlled. Relations with BRICS-- Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa-- will expand.
Trade is flowing as FDI is running. Iran industry needs high technology, which would be provided. Opportunities in the neighboring countries will be met. And dealing with more countries which they know Iran in Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, and others. And the well-skilled manpower needs to find its room in rich Arab countries.
Iranians have investment in niches like car manufacturing, aluminum, telecommunication, and investment in services, private banking, and other issue. I think it is the most pragmatic scenario for Iran would be in 2025. What to do, Iran? The final word is that Iran has to do proposed recognition of all international borders among countries in Persian Gulf, a status quo.
Iran is ready to do that, to recognize all of borders of Arab states, and then propose a new treaty on non-aggression act by regional states. If US forces, they are there because of threat of Iran after removing of Saddam, Iran is ready to sign a treaty of non-aggression pact.
Expanding relations with Arab countries despite of trivial differences and try to solve problems with the US, shifting to a rapprochement with Obama Administration. Increase efficiency and productivity of government. Iranian system has many deficiencies. This is not effective, not efficient, not productive. They must do something to improve this and secure the international respect toward Iran.
And networking of oil and gas production Iran-Iraq pipelines. Iran now is a one consumer of Iraqi oil and gas and products, Iran-Bahrain, Iran-UAE gas pipelines, and swapping of oil from Caspian to Persian Gulf, and built up a strategic partnership with these countries. Anyhow, this is the image of Iran's future in the next generation.
As you can see, all of them are happy. And I think they can decide what to do with Iran. As director said, I am very old. And I think they can manage their country better. Thank you very much.
[APPLAUSE]
AUDIENCE: Very quickly, three very short questions. In the past, as you said yourself, the United States past administration labeled you part of the Axis of Evil. And the Obama Administration certainly follow up on most of the elements of that policy. My question to you, why is that is? Does that have anything to do with the oil in the Gulf?
Israel has something to do with? Why exactly this policy? The second question concerns the present. Syria-- you didn't mention anything about Syria. As you know, Syria regime was the most supportive of the Iranian infrastructure and policies. Currently, Iran is a lukewarm response in comparison to Russia, for example.
The third question, the last one for the future-- the infrastructure of Iranian policy affect your future. Is there any possibility it could change in this idea of supreme religious leader disappears and more complete democracy evolve? You think that's a possibility?
ABBAS MALEKI: OK. The Obama Administration in the first year or two years-- I think two years, yes-- he did some positive gesture. But really, the problem was, in Tehran, that at the same time when he did something positively from Washington, the other voices were negatively from Congress, even from State Department, at the same time which Mr. President did something positive, State Department did something wrong in view of Iranians.
Therefore, Iranians or Iran's government did not receive the very bold signal that United States wants to change its policy toward Iran. And if you remember, when he did, he went to Oval Office. The first decree was to repeat to expand Iran's sanction again, which he did. Every president did every year, annually.
It was in ILSA, Iran and Libya sanctions. He did. The first decree was that. Anyhow, therefore, there are many voices in Washington, which Iran cannot understand which of them is real, which of them is not. On Syria, really, Iran and Syria, they don't have a strategic partnership. Syria was a country which, when Saddam Hussein wanted to say that the United Arabs, they are against Ajam or Iranians, Syria broke this case.
Iran proposed to Syria that I provide you your oil and gas demand, which was 100,000 barrel per day for oil crude oil, which Hafez al-Assad received from Kirkuk-Baniyas pipeline between Iraq and Syria. Because of the case of the differences which they had in framework of Ba'ath party, Iraqi interpretation and Syrian interpretation, Hafez Assad accepted.
Iran send 100,000 barrels per day oil. And he stopped the 1 million barrel per day of Iraqi oil to Baniyas. That was a great victory for Iran. And we did that. From that time until now, Syria had not done anything against Iranian national interest. But it doesn't mean that Syria is a democratic regime. They are not dictators.
They are not a very small group which dominated the country. These are something that in domestic Syria, and despite all of the rhetorics which they say, Iran doesn't lose any interest in Syria if Syria would be a democratic regime. This is Israel which lose. Iran, with the new government, also can work.
Because Iran has oil and gas. Iran has many technology production industries. And Syrians, they need them. Therefore, they can work together. But the problem of Golan Heights, the demonstrations, the new government, which would be [INAUDIBLE] Muslim majority of Syrians are Sunnis. Therefore, well-organized [INAUDIBLE] and Muslim and they were raised there.
These are not problems for Iran. This is an issue which would be discussed in the framework of Levant. And the last one-- really, I don't know what is the problem of Iran's government, even leadership, as you mentioned. I don't know. Is it better or not fully dictatorship in a country? In Iran, there is something which has some elections, for elections, major elections.
Yes. At the same time, there is a velayat-e faqih concept. It's up to Iranians to decide to change it. I don't know.
AUDIENCE: Well, I have a couple of questions. The first one is, we were talking about sanctions. Now, India and Iran have signed that $14 billion bilateral trade deal. In light of that, how effective will the US sanctions regime be? And then the second question, in terms of a lot of the rhetoric coming out, especially from the Likud party concerning the rationale for preemptive strike against Iran, they say that it's because Iran said something.
How is that perceived inside Iran? And do you think that some of the views that are prevalent in the United States are also shared around the world in terms of seeing Iran maybe being bullied by the US?
ABBAS MALEKI: Yes. Iran and India are working together. Noam Chomsky had a speech two days ago in MIT. And he said, when United States says international community, it means United States, Britain, and France. This is international community. Iran has a $40 billion trade with China, $5 billion with Russia is very low with Russia, which, with India, it reaches to $15 billion.
It is very normal, because Iran needs many products. They need oil and gas. Therefore, they have exchanged many commodities and something like that. But the case of the Israelis, I don't know. It's up to you. And it's up to the media. A country every day returns another country to attack it. And it is every day, every day.
And both of these countries are members of United Nations. And nobody says why. What is the rationale of this case they are doing? And recently, the prime minister of Israel mentioned Persian anti-Semitists. Persian anti-Semitists. Jewish knows-- very well knows-- that Iranians, they free the Jewish in the case of the Cyrus and Astor, and many historical background in World War II also.
But now, he accuses Iranians and Persian anti-Semitists. Anyhow, it is legally and with international law. I think it is very questionable. Why do they? But do they want to do that? I think, no. Because if you want to do something, you don't talk a lot about it. OK? These are rhetorics. And these are something like that. But United States is so different.
Because the United States can do that. And it is really threat for Iran if United States decides to do that. For this reason, Iran shows-- many times has shown-- that Iran is eager to solve problems with United States. And recently, three days ago, Iranian leader said that, yes, it is good. President Obama said something, and Iranian leader said, yes, it is good.
It is very positive signal, which Iran shows that it wants to solve problems with United States.
AUDIENCE: [INAUDIBLE] the deputy foreign minister in Iran for about a week. I just have one question. Do you think after the revolution the foreign policy of Iran has been on the wrong side for [INAUDIBLE]?
ABBAS MALEKI: I think you are also Iranian. After the revolution, we did mistakes-- many mistakes-- and many progress. Now, if you come to Tehran, Tehran is a very, very beautiful city with highways, industries, welfare. OK. But we did some mistakes also. Maybe one of them was hostage crisis.
Hostage taking was not so good for Iran. But I want to say, comparing with other part of society and decisions which Iran did internally, domestically, and foreign policy, the record of foreign policy of Iran is acceptable. Because during the many, many crises, Iran remained without any injuries, whether in Iran-Iraq war, in Kuwait crisis, in invasion of Afghanistan, invasion of Iraq, in Soviet collapse.
It is very, very hard to do that. I remember when Iraq-- Saddam Hussein attacked Kuwait. It was in one of the religious holiday. It was in Ashura. And in Iran, all of the offices were closed. Iranian president, Rafsanjani, ordered to establish national security council the day of Ashura to support Saddam, to support Kuwaiti side, or to be neutral.
Then, after I remember, five hours of discussions, Iran reached to the point that it is better to be neutral. It shows that they are working. They are trying to find the substance of issues and then decide.
AUDIENCE: So if we just don't [? catch ?] major powers like the US or Soviet Union and China and et cetera, then could you please count the number of countries from Germany or some other European country or even not in Europe that are considered as allies of Iran or they somehow have reached a [INAUDIBLE] diplomatic relationship?
ABBAS MALEKI: No. Iran doesn't have any ally, doesn't have any strategic partnership with any country. Part of it because of Iran. Iran has a loneliness, a strategic loneliness. None of the countries are like us. In Arab countries, Egyptians, maybe they are like Algerians, or Syrians like Lebanese. Iran is Iran. Even Afghanis, Tajiks have common language with us, but they are not Iranian.
Therefore, Iran is Iran-- only Iran. But second, we have relations. I am very old, and I know that all of the foreign policy is not the case of to choose between good and bad. In foreign policy, you must choose between bad and worse. This is very delicate, very delicate. All of the countries have the same.
Look at the United States. Mrs. Clinton-- two days in Washington, tomorrow in Europe, day after in Asia. Maybe she prefers to be in to be in her home and doesn't go to Japan with maybe 16-hour flight, but she must go because this is the essence of foreign policy. Foreign policy is very, very complicated.
Iran has good relations with countries. Yes, Iran has. Iran has good relations with China, with India, with Japan, recently with Japan, with Russia. With Arab states, yes, we did some mistakes. I say "we" because I don't want to say that Mr. Ahmadinejad. Iranian government did some mistakes. But it doesn't mean that Iranian government doesn't work on foreign policy.
They are working 24 hours. Mr. Salehi is professor of Sharif University. I know him very well. He tries a lot. And he is trying to repair these relations. If we survive during these sanctions and issues, and we can settle the problem of nuclear, I think Iran will go again very rapidly to be one of the major partners in the international scene.
AUDIENCE: I have a single simple question. Your last slide, you had a picture of young people in Iran. And you said that, look at them, they're happy, that you're old, and that you feel comfortable leaving the future of Iran in their hands. I'm wondering why you picked a picture that only had boys in it.
ABBAS MALEKI: Because I am naive. Yes, yes. You are right. But really, you must come to Tehran, or you have been, I don't know. The ladies are running all of the things. This is the same. They are driving. They are voting. They have many NGOs. They are very active. Really, Iranian women are 50% of society, which are more active than the rest of other part.
AUDIENCE: Your slides-- you told us at some length about the oil and gas reserves in Iran, that they are second only to Russia, even ahead of Saudi Arabia in their reserves. With all of that oil and gas, what do you need with nuclear power, which has been proven to be [? unsafe ?] in Japan and Russia, and in Pennsylvania in this country.
So the only answer would be nuclear weapons. And that has a lot to do with your negative foreign relations with your neighbors and with the West. Do you agree?
ABBAS MALEKI: Yes. You are right. If the United States says today that, I don't have any objection about Iran's peaceful nuclear program, I think tomorrow Iranians will sit and look at nuclear program with analysis of cost and benefit. For example, Iran has 1,000 megawatt nuclear power plant in the south.
And Iran's capacity for electricity is 50,000. It means one fiftieth or 2% of Iran's electricity comes from nuclear. But from the cost angle, Iran's with the gas cycle thermodynamic combination something like that in power plants, it is the cheapest in the world for Iran to receive gas or other fuels to do that for electricity.
And the most expensive is nuclear. But when you order to a country, to the young engineers of a country, you cannot think about the nuclear technology. You must think only-- and only-- conventional oil and gas, reaction would be, why? What is different between me and American engineer? This is the case.
I want to say, countries are like the people. They need respect. They need confidence. And you must recognize them. United States doesn't want to recognize that Iranians are smart. They can manage a nuclear power plant. Despite as you mentioned, in United States also was a disaster in 1979.
These are issues that remains unsolved. I don't say that the United States tells that we don't have any observation about nuclear weapons. If United States say, we agree that Iran also can have access to nuclear industries in the framework of non-proliferation treaty, I think Iranians agree to stop part of it.
They will stop uranium enrichment from 5% to 20%. This is officially declared that Iran is ready to halt uranium enrichment from 5% to 20%. But United States doesn't agree.
AUDIENCE: [INAUDIBLE] because you talked about how you don't really understand why Iran or the government is perceived as anti-Israel and [INAUDIBLE]. And the comments that have been on YouTube of video of the president making anti-Israeli comments. And but you do [INAUDIBLE] the Ayatollah says that Israel is a cancerous tumor. I mean, as a scholar, we see both sides of these type of equations.
Is it not possible to see that it's rational for us to perceive the government as anti-Semitic?
FREDRIK LOGEVALL: Could you perhaps restate the question for everybody in case they didn't hear the question?
ABBAS MALEKI: Both sides have many rhetorics against each side. And President Ahmadinejad knows that anti-Israeli rhetoric is very popular in Islamic world. But yes, you are right. But I want to add this case that, please, quantitatively, we can survey New York Times. How many times Israelis threaten Iran, and how many Iranians they did?
Really, this is the Israeli side. It is daily. Daily. And daily, they say that we want to attack Iran. The other side, the another part, the Iranian side, they are doing something rhetorically. But they don't say we want to attack to Israel. It is very, very delicate issue. And they are thinking about the words. Iranian leader, Iranian president don't say that we want to attack to Israel.
But prime minister of Israel says every day that we will do that, we will do that, we will do that.
AUDIENCE: So calling Israel a cancer is not?
ABBAS MALEKI: No. Calling Israel as a cancer-- it is not the meaning in legal affairs that we want to invade Israel. But when prime minister, he said-- it is in New York Times-- we will do that, not tomorrow, but maybe a month later. Legally, it violates international law. Legally, it is very clear. But nobody says anything.
AUDIENCE: Yes, I think Turkey and Iran have a good relationship. But you mentioned Turkey as a new emerging challenge for Iran. Could you please clarify it?
FREDRIK LOGEVALL: A question about Turkey and its relations.
ABBAS MALEKI: Turkey is one of the partners for Iran. From 1979 until now, there is not any year which Turkey would be a threat for Iran in the evaluation of threats which every country does. Because of the nature of these two countries and the cooperation, no. Turkey and Iran have highest level after United Arab Emirates, which UAE re-exports commodities to Iran, doesn't build or industries-- they don't-- Chinese and others.
But Turkey is the first. And Iran-Turkey relation is very good during Iran-Iraq war. After that, after the new Islamic party also, during [INAUDIBLE] Gul, Mr. Erdogan. Even [INAUDIBLE] Ozal [INAUDIBLE] because of the nature of relations. I told that rivals, in the case of the access to the new markets in central Asia, Iranians want to go to invest in central Asia.
The Turkish merchants and businessmen have come earlier. This is something like competitiveness in business, not politics.
FREDRIK LOGEVALL: A few minutes left, so let's maybe [INAUDIBLE].
AUDIENCE: A question of perceptions in international relations-- do you see any areas where Tehran has risk perceptions about the United States or the West, where Washington or Europe has misperceptions about Iran? And we have slight misperceptions?
ABBAS MALEKI: Yes. It is very interesting question. Misperception, which Iran has from United States, Iran feels that United States is a hostage of Israeli foreign policy. Maybe there are some lobbies here, like AIPAC. But I think, no, there are many, many peoples, scholars, decision makers that they are working and they are talking independently.
This is first. Second is that Iran feels that West is a unique entity. Between United States, Britain, and others, the government cannot distinguish very well, which you know and I know that France has its national interest, United States, Britain, Germany, and others. Misperceptions of United States forces that.
Iran's government or elite believe that United States doesn't have problems with Nuclear File. If Iran says, OK, Nuclear File is my problem, I close Bushehr, I close all of enriched uranium facilities, Iran feels that tomorrow, a day after, United States says, OK, what do you do about human rights?
If Iran says, OK, I will do-- the third issue, what do you do about terrorism? There are many articles in Tehran that says United States has problem with a country with this size in the strategic part of the world. This is too big for United States. Maybe it is not right. It is not correct, I think. But they believe that some people in Washington, they believe a small Iran is better.
Maybe the courts would be with Kurdish in Iraq and Turkey, the Turkmens, Azeris, others. And small Iran is better. This is misperception. Because as I know, the strong Iran also is part of the strategy of United States if United States can solve problems. Because Iran can support United States to counterattack to narcotic traffic, drug trafficking.
Iran is a very good partner to attack to extremism. Iran knows about Taliban. Iran knows about al-Qaeda a lot. Many of them came to Iran when United States attacked Afghanistan. Iran has a lot of information about insurgency in Iraq, because Iran is a big country, a strong country, has access to these countries.
Therefore, Iran can support. They have common interests in Middle East. Unfortunately, misperception in Washington doesn't let them look at Iran correctly. Misperception here is a lot. One of the candidate of Republicans in campaign said three weeks ago that, if I would be the next president of United States, I will order to close American embassy in Tehran.
She doesn't know that American embassy was closed 33 years ago. OK? There are many, many misperceptions here. I talked with one of professors last year here in Boston. I invited him to come to Tehran. He asked me, do you have two fellows building in Tehran? He felt that Tehran is maybe like [INAUDIBLE] or some cities in Arab countries or Afghanistan.
Really, the case is very, very dangerous. The generation of Iranian studies experts-- most of them, they are going to be [INAUDIBLE]. Some of them are Richard Frye, Pope, Richard Cottam, and others, James [? Baileys, ?] and others-- the new generation has not educated and developed. This gap is really against Iran.
Nobody knows about Iran a lot here in this country. The mistake was done by Iranian government also. Iran's government did not support the Persian studies chairs, Iranian studies chairs in American universities during Iran-Iraq war and after that. Therefore, the information, the knowledge on Iran is very rare here, very rare, very.
AUDIENCE: When I read about Iran, I very often get the impression that the religious powers, religious leaders have a huge indirect influence on a lot-- if not all-- aspects of governance. But, then again, on the politics, regional, local, otherwise have nothing to do with what I studied in my career. So I'm just very curious to see your opinion on the matter.
And if that is true, I mean, how is this power exercised?
ABBAS MALEKI: This is the Iranian system. Yes, Iranian leader has a lot of influence. Yes, it has. But what is the solution? Solution is that the Iranian peoples must decide. But I think the foreign policy and sanctions now are not working toward Iranian decisions or Iranian rational decisions.
All of the items shows to Iranians it is better to keep government strong because of the rhetoric from Israel. Not only Israel, Arab states also. United States has given $60 billion air fighters to Saudi Arabia. And the tone of Saudi Arabia has been changed to Tehran-- $60 billion. These are the politics.
FREDRIK LOGEVALL: Let's finish with one last question here, gentleman.
AUDIENCE: It seems that the trend has moved toward misperceptions identified in the media primarily. I don't believe a lot that comes out of the media. However, there just seems to be an element of mistrust. Iran has been identified as an exporter of terrorism, as a very authoritarian regime. Headlines about some Christian pastor sentenced to death.
What do you feel that needs to be done from an Iranian standpoint? Can they be more transparent? Can they be more honest? Can they open up their nuclear facilities to the UN inspection agency? I think, to sort of piggyback on some of the questions that have been asked, that would do a lot, I think, to diffuse the image around the world that they cannot be trusted with nuclear weapons, or that they would move quickly toward to acquire nuclear weapons.
ABBAS MALEKI: Yes. I think Iran's government need public relations companies to help it. Really, they don't use the tools which are very influential in United States-- lobbies, companies. For example, nobody talks here about this case that 15 peoples of 19 members of al-Qaeda, which they attack 9/11, 15 of them were Saudi nationals.
But I have read many articles that they are talking that Iranians were behind this case. It shows that Saudi Arabia works with the media directly by public relations and others. Iran really needs. One problem is that misperception. Iran's Shah did many times used public relations before his visit here.
For example, once, Iranian ambassador, Ardeshir Zahedi, who was the son of [INAUDIBLE] Shah, he gave to Elizabeth Taylor a ring, $500,000. It is part of politics of that time. Iran feels and felt after revolution these are very, very negative. For this reason, now, Iranians don't have even access to do interview with New York Times, Washington Post.
But the case of nuclear you mentioned, yes, it is true. Iran can do that. And I think Iran is ready. Now, Mr. Jalili sent a letter to Mrs. Ashton. And he said that, we are ready to negotiate. Mrs. Ashton replied, and they are readiness also P5+1. But I think it needs a media coverage. It needs more discussions to support the better proposals.
I know, for example, some Americans did one proposal. And they sent to Iranian side and European side also. There are many activities. The problem is, when the case would be unsanctioned and rhetoric over military attack, these issues would be vanished or would be very opaque.
Anyhow, I think the best way for both sides is to sit and negotiate and talk about the issues. And I think, despite of the fact that I am not in Iran's government, but I think Iran's government now is ready to do something to solve nuclear problem, Nuclear File. Thank you.
FREDRIK LOGEVALL: That's, I think, an appropriate point at which to end. I think I for one will be thinking long about caviar, persimmons, and watermelon, and which of these scenarios, in fact, we'll see. But I want to thank all of you. I want to thank you for a spirited, but, shall we say, calmly directed questions. And I want to thank all of you for attending.
Much to think about in this debate and this lecture. And now, finally, I ask you to join me in thanking Professor Maleki for being here with us.
[APPLAUSE]
Abbas Maleki, Iran's deputy foreign minister 1988-1997, spoke about the Iranian mindset and Iran's future prospects during a visit to Cornell March 12, 2012.
The talk was part of the Mario Einaudi Center for International Studies' Foreign Policy Distinguished Speaker Series.
