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SIDNEY TARROW: A footnote before we begin. If Glenn and I are still talking to each other after this is over, we're planning to teach a Cornell Adult University course in the summer of 2020 prior to the next election. That's if we're still talking to each other.
Reflecting on this book as we enter the third year of the Trump presidency, I was reminded of how I felt in 1989 at Cornell when I was teaching a course on Marxism, communism, and revolution. You will remember 1989.
I had planned that course with a clear idea of how I was going to deal with each of the countries of the former Soviet bloc. Yet that bloc began to implode one brick at a time. And each lecture I had prepared was out of date by the time I gave it. Marxism and communism gave way to revolutions faster than I could revise my Cornell lecture notes.
I feel the same way today about the Trump presidency and about the resistance to it. When David Meyer and I proposed this book to Oxford Press in the summer of 2017, we thought we'd seen everything there was to see.
There was Trump's anti-Muslim ban and the lawyers' movement against it that Mike Dorf and Michael Tew wrote about in our book. There was the Charlottesville anti-neo-Nazi march and the antifascist movement against it. There were Trump's assaults on women and the Woman's March that followed. Two years later, all of that seems like a prelude to what was to come. And it ain't over yet.
It's a good thing that Meyer and I had the presence of mind to add the subtitle The Dawn of the Anti-Trump Opposition Movement. We started out as political scientists. But things have moved so quickly that we ended up would-be historians. Glenn will tell you whether we're real historians or mere political scientists with historical pretensions.
The history that we and our coauthors dealt with did not begin on November 8, 2016. Remember that there were protest movements before Trump's election-- the Tea Party, Occupy Wall Street, and Black Lives Matter, just to name a few.
But though Trump's enormities and his threat to democracy stand out, one of our key messages is that his election was only the culmination of a trend that has been developing in American politics much longer-- over several generations, in fact. This is the trend that Doug McAdam in his chapter in our book identifies as a trend of polarization, negative partisanship, and racialization.
Race lay under the surface of American politics until Trump brought it out. He campaigned on an apocalyptic promise-- that the United States was in the midst of a critical moment in which its institutions, its politics, its very racial composition were failing. Policies on crime, immigration, and trade had created an American carnage, the term he used in his inauguration. The country was collapsing. And he pronounced that he and he alone could fix it.
I won't take much time describing Trump's first two years in office. You were all here-- or most of you were-- to witness it. He attacked racial and religious minorities. He pulled out of the Paris Climate Treaty. He ended the nuclear deal with Iran. He undermined the Trans-Pacific Trade Agreement and our key alliances in Europe. He cozied up to autocrats abroad and to wealthy allies at home. And he shut down the government over his campaign promise to build a border wall with Mexico.
Trump's victory created exactly the threat that he had described. In response to this threat, early resisters grasped at dramatic strategies in denial that someone like Trump could hold the highest office in the land. Activists called for the preemptive impeachment of Trump for deploying the 25th Amendment against him because he was clearly unfit for office.
They urged members of the electoral college to deny him the fruits of the election he had lost. He lost the popular vote. And they hoped for some constitutional deus ex machina to rescue the Constitution and democracy from the verdict of the electoral college.
The predictable failure of these hopes was followed by the massive turnout at the first Women's March, which was only the first episode of what we call "the resistance." That march was composed not only of women and not only of women's issues. Its claims went well beyond the feminist movement. And as word of it spread around the country, it brought out hundreds of thousands of opponents, including 10,000 on the Ithaca Commons.
When Meyer and I launched our book project, the resistance had already begun to diversify. The Women's March was followed by national marches on taxes, on the environment, climate, science, the investigation of Russian influence on the election, and Black Lives Matter demonstrations, to name just a few.
Here's a list of the major Washington, DC, protests that another of our authors, Dana Fisher, studied during the first year of the Trump administration. Fisher brought a group of her students to Washington, DC, to carry out on-site interviews with participants in these marches. She interviewed several thousand of them.
She found many of the usual suspects-- feminists, students, veterans of the 1960s. But she also found a striking proportion of first-time protesters who had never protested before, creating a new level of engagement that spread to the local level. And there are wonderful stories about women who came to the march in Washington on their own. In the bus on the way back, they met other women like themselves. And they formed resistance groups when they got back home.
Theda Skocpol, a well-known Harvard sociologist, and Laura Putnam, a historian at the University of Pittsburgh, interviewed hundreds of these women who went back from the Women's March and formed resistance groups of their own. In the course of their interviews, Putnam and Skocpol found an epochal generation in the making, a cohort of Americans for whom life cycle stage and personal trajectory came together with public events in ways that changed life after life in very similar and very consequential directions.
Newly engaged suburban activists, they found, hail from across the ideological range from center to left. It's not a Sanders versus Clinton redux because that was last year's news. And it was flatly irrelevant to people working shoulder to shoulder in the present. It wasn't an Occupy Wall Street-type questioning of liberal democracy, because these activists believed that laws make good government as strong and as transparent as possible.
Importantly, the resistance also spread to people working within nonprofit groups and in mainstream politics. We see this in the tripling of the membership of the American Civil Liberties Union. We see it in the formation of new media groups, like the ones that David Carr studied in our book, with names like Pod Save America. We see it in a group that announced its existence only the day before yesterday, the feminist Supermajority, led by Cecile-- what's her last name?
AUDIENCE: [INAUDIBLE]
SIDNEY TARROW: Richards, thank you. Led by Cecile Richards--
AUDIENCE: Richards.
SIDNEY TARROW: Richards? OK-- with a group of women who come from a variety of both feminist and nonfeminist groups. Watch for it. It's going to be a major actor in the 2020 elections.
The resistance groups that arose in the wake of Trump's elections transitioned into electoral politics in the 2018 midterms. And many of the representatives that are sitting in Congress today came out of that movement. This is a map of the United States, obviously, which shows the number of resistance groups that started out as part of the resistance movement and which transitioned into electoral politics.
In our book, we examine three challenges that the resistance poses, first its challenge to social movement theorists like ourselves. Second, its challenge to the American left. And third and most important, its challenge to democracy.
On the first challenge, the most important thing that sets the Trump phenomenon apart from normal politics is that it isn't normal politics. It is a social movement. It has a charismatic leader. It has a devoted following. It has its own media outlets.
And this is why it's useless to tell Trump's followers that his policies are irrational. Rationality is not the reason they voted for him in the first place. And it's not the reason why they are deaf to all the information about his lies, his corruption, and his distortion of American democracy.
Because Trump's following is a movement and not a party, it follows that the resistance against him is something like a counter movement. And this holds both advantages and disadvantages for the resistance.
The main advantage is that Trump provides a bigger-than-life focal point for opponents to attack. He's always there. He's always committing outrages. There is always someone to attack. But the disadvantage is that his volatility and his incessant policy gyrations make him a moving target that is difficult for the resistance to focus on.
Our second challenge was to understand the implications of this first challenge for the American left. Trump's volatility exacerbates the usual divisions on the left between radicals and liberals.
In a stylized formulation, we can say that one faction, best reflected in the figure of Joe Biden, remains committed to preservation of our institutions, essentially offering a stepped-up version of politics as usual, while the other, most dramatically reflected in the figure of Alexandra Ocasio-Cortez, sees the preservation of normal politics as a kind of acquiescence to the unique threat of Trump. And this division is playing itself out in the current struggle for the presidential nomination. But it is much wider and goes much more deeply into the American left.
Finally, our book asks what the Trump presidency and the resistance against it tells us about the prospects for American democracy. Two political scientists, one of them born and bred in Ithaca, New York, Steve Levitsky, have published a book which I recommend warmly called How Democracies Die, where they compare Trump's first year in office to what past dictators did as they established authoritarian power in places like Italy, Germany, and Argentina. Their predictions are not comforting.
Vigorously, and more or less explicitly, Trump offered racialized positions on immigration and crime. He picked Twitter fights with targets like black football players who had knelt during the national anthem. He identified with white nationalists, legitimating their cause and identifying it with the Republican Party.
The increased visibility and volatility of white nationalism presents both an opportunity and an obstacle for the resistance. It's an opportunity because it brings together a wide coalition of Americans around the central American creed that goes beyond the American left. But it's an obstacle because it polarizes American society around the deepest and most volatile cleavage in our history-- race. And the revived racist right is unlikely to disappear at the end of the Trump presidency.
In his chapter of our book, Ken Roberts, who is here, points out that Trump differs from European authoritarians in that they had to found new political parties in order to attack the establishment from the outside. Because of the two-party system and the electoral college, Trump has the luxury of exploiting the machinery and the reputation of an existing party with a legitimacy that's born of its 150-year history.
But Trump's takeover of the GOP is also a double-edged sword. Just as it gives him the support of many non-Trumpian conservative voters who instinctively vote Republican, it brands that party with every new outrage that comes from his Twitter feed and from his demagogic rallies.
Donald Trump is undermining the function of American institutions, including the bureaucracy, the military, and social welfare, both by his erratic management and funding and by undermining public support for those institutions. Those are the policy targets that the resistance must attack.
But the danger to American democracy goes much deeper than Trump's policies. In his excellent book, my colleague David Bateman, who is also here, reminds us that democracy is constantly under threat from those whose definition of the people puts large sectors of the population under threat.
He writes, in recent years, the United States has seen a new wave of disenfranchisement through ballot restrictions that make it more difficult for certain classes to vote, through the denial of voting rights for ex-felons, the denial of citizenship rights, and the inhumane treatment of deporting people from the country in which they've made their home, by political assaults on the organizational life of the working class, and by the aggressive police surveillance and harassment of communities of color. These are the deeper abuses that the resistance must concentrate on.
The resistance is fighting this disenfranchised democracy. It could produce a revitalized civil society. It could create a more engaged and more informed citizenry. Activists could build broader communities of engagement and create cooperative and sympathetic connections among different groups and engender a new respect for the importance of political institutions and a deeper commitment to democracy. Ultimately, this could be the main legacy of the resistance. Thank you.
[APPLAUSE]
He thinks he doesn't need a microphone.
SPEAKER 1: [INAUDIBLE]
SIDNEY TARROW: [INAUDIBLE] the stream. You need it for the stream.
GLENN ALTSCHULER: Well, I wouldn't want the stream to be denied. Sid, why don't you take this and take that? Whoops. Thank you. Thank you.
Good afternoon. I'm here not to bury Sid Tarrow, but to praise him. Sid is unique among Cornell professors and most academics. Many of us, including me, do not have one distinguished career. Sid Tarrow has had two distinguished careers as an expert in comparative government and now as an expert in social movements.
And it's a delight to share a stage and platform with him. I'm also here at his request because he was too embarrassed to push his own book and thought that it would be better coming from me to encourage you to make bulk purchases of it following the presentation this afternoon.
So let me return to The Resistance. Any good book, in my judgment, has to have two eyes. And I define "eyes" as information and insight. The Resistance, which is a very early commentary on the anti-Trump opposition movement, is indeed full of information and insight. And I want to begin by highlighting some of the things that I learned from this book.
This book has a lot to say about the organizational infrastructure of the anti-Trump movement. That organizational infrastructure is something we really don't hear very much about. When we think of social media platforms, we think of the social media platforms of the right. When we think of organizational anti-establishment movements, we think of those more on the right-- Tea Party-- than on the left-- Occupy Wall Street, somewhat ephemeral. When we think of enduring organizations, we think more of those on the right than on the left.
So a couple of examples of descriptions of what's going on in the anti-Trump movement that I knew nothing about. First, we have information about resistance media. Resistance media are very much in place, we learn, in opposition to the Breitbarts. MoveOn's VideoLab, for example, is highlighted in an essay in this book. Sleeping Giants' advertiser boycott is highlighted in this book.
We are introduced-- or at least I was introduced-- to Indivisible, a resistance organization that its founders have deployed and that has already accrued social and political capital to mobilize support. It's founded by a group of well-connected political insiders. And it deals locally, as well as globally, in its approach. We who are deeply concerned about the Trump presidency need to know what those organizations are and to understand how we might participate in them if we choose to do so.
There is information as well in this book that is perhaps somewhat surprising even to those of us who follow politics pretty closely. In an essay called "Mobilizing for Immigrant and Latino Rights," we learn that despite some of the myths, only 22% of Latinos express opposition to the Black Lives Matter movement. Many of us thought that there was profound, deep, and pervasive conflict between Latino voters, Latinos, and blacks.
A larger percentage of US-born Latinos support Black Lives Matter than Latino immigrants. But there is solid support in both groups. And again, somewhat surprisingly, attitudes of Latinos toward lesbian, gay, and bisexual people is rather surprisingly positive as measured. These are very important things to understand if you're interested in coalition politics and seek to build on some of that information.
In the brief time that I have, I had to decide which essay or essays to focus on in my remarks. And you may be surprised to learn that I decided to focus on Professor Tarrow's essay on this. An unfortunate choice perhaps, but what the hell, he's here. And he dragooned me into doing this in the first place.
So there are some questions that I think might be asked of Professor Tarrow but I think more generally of those who are interested in the resistance. At one point in his essay, Professor Tarrow describes the differences between Democrats and Republicans in this way. The Democrats were and perhaps are a coalition of interest groups, while the Republicans are or perhaps were an ideological party.
Because then on the same page, Professor Tarrow quotes something that he quoted in his presentation. He says that the discordant elements in Trump's campaign appeals are of little importance to his followers because, like most populist leaders, the quality of his support is personal and not policy based, charismatic and not routinized, mobilizational and not governance oriented.
And it leads one to wonder what the role of ideology in the Trump phenomenon actually is. I think that there is a role for ideology in the Trump movement and that it's not entirely clear, as Professor Tarrow indicated, that his supporters will go along with him, as students say, irregardless of what he might say or do. This needs some unpacking, it seems to me. And it will be helpful for those who seek to resist.
It's also relevant because Professor Tarrow several placed pages later talks about slippage from Trump's base. And here I would say we have evidence of Sid Tarrow that I have rarely encountered in the 40 years that I have known him-- Tarrow, the cockeyed optimist, who sees slippage where some of the rest of us see almost no slippage.
And that, too, needs to be unpacked, especially since we need to understand something that is difficult to understand about the Trump phenomenon. And that is a question. What happened to establishment Republicans?
It appears that there were only about seven or eight establishment Republicans in the United States in 2016. Establishment Republicans seemed not to have a small number of followers. They appear to have had no followers in 2016. And that's a little hard to explain.
Professor Tarrow explains it by saying that the way was prepared by the Tea Party's hostile takeover of the Republican Party. But I'm not sure that's the entire explanation. I will just point out to you here in my own moment of cockeyed optimism that there have been some changes in party identification in the United States. And they explain, to some extent, why President Trump's popularity among Republicans has stayed so high.
Here is party identification as it appears to be in 2018, 2019. About 25% of Americans identify as Republicans. About 32% of Americans identify as Democrats. About 35% or 37% of Americans identify as independents. The number and percentage of independents has grown dramatically. And independents in the United States really are not independents. They tend to vote pretty consistently with one party or another.
President Trump has 85% or 90% support among Republicans because many of those establishment Republicans now don't identify as Republicans. They identify as independents. And they, their role, their allegiance, both in local elections and in national elections, needs to be better understood.
Let me end this portion of my remarks by talking about Professor Tarrow's emphasis, both in his essay and in his presentation today, on the need for democratic unity, the need for a united front in the resistance. And it seems to me-- and this is explicit in both the presentation and in his chapter-- that that unity can be achieved only if there is, in essence, a consensus that democracy is in danger. It can't be achieved if this is another election or even an extremely important election.
And I'm not sure that that sense of urgency about the danger of democracy is there. It's there in this room. It may be there throughout Olin Library. Is it there even in Whitney Point? I'm not sure. How the opposition can broaden the number of people who see the election in those terms is difficult.
And normally, presidential elections don't work that way. Perhaps this one will be different. This certainly will be different in many respects. But we really have yet to see that. And I'm also going to say-- and I'll end my remarks by focusing a little bit on the election to come in 2018.
Strategies for congressional elections and presidential elections are different. In the election of 2018, the Democrats did not have and did not need a unified message. You can have Conor Lamb run in Pennsylvania as a Second Amendment supporter and win. And the Democratic National Committee will be fine about that.
You can have candidates whose base is in New York City or San Francisco run hard on the left. You can have Green New Deal advocates and supporters. It's much more difficult to do that if you have one presidential candidate. And Donald Trump is good at punching his opponents and getting them a little bit off stride.
In my view, if the message is the danger to democracy, the Democrats will not win. That doesn't quite do it with highly pragmatic voters who tend to be more interested in the economy, who tend to be interested in-- are more interested not so much in policy, but in larger themes and differences between one party or another.
I want to close by just wondering a little bit about what it might mean for the resistance to play a long game. The right has had a unique talent in my judgment in playing a long game. Think about Supreme Court appointments and grooming potential Supreme Court appointments-- Federalist Society and other organizations.
Think about gerrymandering and the role of Tom DeLay and others over a 20-year period in making it likely that the Republicans would hold many more congressional districts than they otherwise might deserve if the districts were drawn by a bipartisan commission. Think about the Tea Party strategies over a longer period of time and so on.
The Democrats have not been good in playing a long game. And I don't think the left has been all that good in playing a long game. And what do you do if the needs, as they appear to be to many, are urgent? Can you play a short game and a long game at exactly the same time?
Barack Obama, whatever his virtues, was terrible at the long game. The Democratic Party lost 900 seats in state legislatures during Barack Obama's presidency. And that has been devastating for the Democratic Party.
The Democratic Party was hollowed out under Barack Obama. And we're paying a price for that, a very significant price. So the resistance movement, it seems to me, has to somehow balance all of these extraordinarily difficult to balance issues and to do so with the urgency of now because many of us do believe that there is an urgency to now.
Let me just say one more thing about the short game and long game. I am deeply concerned about the new rules of the Democratic National Committee for the primary season. There is no winner take all in any primary. If a candidate gets 15% of the vote, that candidate gets some delegates.
The rules for the debate stage mean that almost everyone who declares as a candidate will, at least at the moment, appear on the debate stage. And if you take the first four primaries or caucuses-- Iowa, New Hampshire, Nevada, and South Carolina. They're four completely different states-- it's possible that 15 candidates will be viable following the first four primaries.
And if that is the case, much time will be spent with Democrats divided. And it will be more difficult to unify around a single candidate. Now, I'm not saying that will happen. But the rules make it more likely.
Let me just conclude by saying that we need more public intellectuals among our academics here and elsewhere. This is a time in which informed people need to reach beyond their classrooms, their academic journals, to weigh in, as Professor Tarrow has done and his colleagues have done, here. Because there has never been-- or at least since the Civil War, perhaps, there has never been a moment where the discourse needs to be more informed by something other than alternate facts.
So I think we've allowed for 14 minutes for lively questions. So Sid is happy to take them. I'm gone. I'm going to get a cookie.
[APPLAUSE]
SIDNEY TARROW: OK, the floor is open. Who would like to cast the first stone?
SPEAKER 2: OK. I think we've got one. I see one here and then one over there. So I'll walk it over to Gene and then get Robin.
AUDIENCE: [INAUDIBLE] first. You're going to give Gene the first opportunity. Sid, back in 2012, I think, you wrote a book called The Language of Contention. To what extent has the language changed from your analysis then to now? And what role has the social media played in changing that language?
SIDNEY TARROW: I could answer that question in two hours, I suppose. But I'm only going to take two minutes. That's a great question, Gene. And I have actually written a short essay about just this. I think that social media has foreshortened, simplified, and to some extent cheapened political language.
I wrote a piece about a book that a colleague of mine wrote. And I said, imagine Tom Paine. We have Isaac Kramnick here, who is an expert on Tom Paine. Imagine Tom Paine using social media. Imagine the language that he uses on social media. It would be shut down immediately because it was too wordy. It was too complex. It was too subtle. Social media has really cheapened political discourse.
But I wonder if that is the fundamental reason for the cheapening of political discourse. I wonder if it isn't a more fundamental polarization of American life. It used to be that people would choose a political party and that that choice was independent of their other life choices.
Now sociologists are discovering not only are people divided by their party identification. That party identification can be predicted almost mathematically by where they live, by where their children go to school, by what kind of car they drive, even by what kind of clothes they wear. In other words, there's been a polarization of American life that's gone much deeper than party identification.
So when Glenn says party identification has changed, I agree with him. But one way it's changed is that it has gone more deeply into American society. We were just on a trip with a group of 24 bright, mostly retired, upper-middle-class Americans, most of them Democrats from what I could tell. We got close to a family that identified itself as Christian, former military, and so forth.
And I said to this lovely woman, what do you think of politics today in America? And she said to me, it's all about the deep state. Now, whether you agree or you disagree with what she said, it was immediately clear to me where she lives, what she reads, what she doesn't read.
And so I said to her, do you read the Drudge Report? Oh, she said, every day. I knew that because of this rather foreshortened symbol of the deep state, which she reads about on the Drudge Report and which helps her to understand all the things she dislikes about American politics. So it's not a pretty picture. I don't know if that answers your question, Gene. OK.
SPEAKER 2: I think we have a question from 106.
SPEAKER: I have a comment and then a question. You mentioned that the Democratic Party was hollowed out starting in 2010. And I would agree with that given the electoral losses that occurred. It seems to me that in addition to the Democratic Party getting hollowed out, the country was hollowed out. You had a Democrat party that was willing to send jobs overseas, to give up on manufacturing.
The coasts were doing just fine. But the center of the country, the Rust Belt, the center of the country, was having tremendous trouble. And one of the things that President Trump did was to speak to the center of the country and to say, we're not giving up on manufacturing. We're not going to give up on you.
And in fact, over the last two years, he's actually managed to do that. We have manufacturing jobs returning. You have unemployment at record lows. You have an economy that's growing at 3%, something that did not occur in a single year of the Obama administration.
SIDNEY TARROW: So what's the question? What is the question?
AUDIENCE: The question is-- well, I wanted to make a comment, as a matter of fact. That's really what I wanted to do. And I do believe that you're--
SIDNEY TARROW: OK. Then I have a question for you. If you're not going to ask a question, I'll ask a question. And the question I would like to ask you is, are you making any distinction at all between campaign promises and actual behavior in office? Because if you are, then I would ask you to look at a few facts.
One, unemployment began to go down as soon as Obama was elected, not as soon as Trump was elected. Two, the tariff war that the Trump administration has begun to wage on the world has had many victims, among them American farmers in the Midwest who cannot sell their soybeans to China the way they were able to before.
And third, I would ask you to look at the rate of tax abatement for millionaires and billionaires under the Trump tax law and ask yourself-- and I don't have the answer to this, I must say. But I suspect what the answer would be. Ask yourself if those millionaires and billionaires have passed those tax profits onto their workers. And I think you'll probably find that they have not.
AUDIENCE: Is that a question for me?
GLENN ALTSCHULER: I'm going to try to parse this a little bit. I want to begin with the gentleman's observation. There's no question that Donald Trump appealed to angry, frustrated, disaffected, white males in the working class, in the Rust Belt, and elsewhere. And to ignore that is a mistake.
Hillary Clinton didn't go to those states. Donald Trump did. He made some promises. I think since I didn't get a chance, even though I was dying to, to respond to the previous question, I'm going to blend my response to that question to my comment on this one.
When you think about politics, here's what you need to know. Americans don't know shit about politics. Americans loathe politicians. Americans hate the establishment.
And Americans are not interested in the kinds of responses that Sid Tarrow just gave. That's wonky responses. They're interested in rhetorical responses, in symbols, in slogans, and their own sense of where they are. And so the debate that we've just had in this room is a debate that the Democrats will not win. They will not win. They need to make different kinds of appeals.
Now, what I would say to the gentlemen is that President Trump has lied to Americans. And let's go back to language. Just two days ago, he used the word "execution" for what is done to newly born babies. He's used the term "invasion" for people who are presenting themselves and seeking asylum.
This is the debasement of the language. It was always there because Americans don't pay that much attention to politics. And if you look at Lincoln's campaign and Jefferson's campaign, you'll see some awful language and debased language. The question is, how do we respond to this?
And if the man who just spoke wishes to give credit to the president for low unemployment and a 3% GDP growth, all presidents claim credit for what is done on their watch. And he's responding no differently than almost everybody responds. And that's the nature of political debate. We don't know whether there will be 3% growth in the economy in 2020. And a lot may depend on whether there is a recession or there is not a recession.
And the resistance that Professor Tarrow is talking about is going to have to be nimble enough to respond to the political and economic realities on the ground as they see them and craft appeals that resonate with voters. Hillary Clinton did not do that. Donald Trump did do that. And what we will need is a campaign of people who understand how politics is conducted in this country and how much attention and what kind of attention voters pay to specific policy issues.
And since we've been told we got to get out of here-- there's a bar mitzvah that begins shortly. And the bar mitzvah initiate is practicing outside this wall and waiting to get in. I want to say that we need more discussion. We need more debate. We need more engagement.
And it has to be informed by people who choose to be informed about politics and then who find ways to communicate that information. So like everyone in this room, I'm very grateful for Sid Tarrow, who has given me a model for how to live into my senior years. Thank you all for coming.
[APPLAUSE]
In a Chats in the Stacks book talk, Sidney Tarrow, Emeritus Maxwell Upson Professor of Government and adjunct professor at Cornell Law School, presents The Resistance: The Dawn of the Anti-Trump Opposition Movement, co-edited with David S. Meyer. Featuring both younger and senior scholars, the book unearths the origins and dynamics of different sectors of the anti-Trump movement.
Tarrow, in conversation with Glenn Altschuler, Thomas and Dorothy Litwin Professor of American Studies, gives an overview of these emerging movements, and provides sharp analyses on how they might exercise lasting political influence.
